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Eleonore Stump. Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem 
of Suffering. Oxford University Press, 2010.
Wandering in Darkness is eleonore Stump’s magisterial treatment of the 
problem of evil, combining work she has fashioned and revised from 
some of the most prestigious lecture series, including the Gifford lectures, 
the Wilde lectures, and the Stewart lectures. It is bold, meticulously 
argued (chapters are marked by lengthy, stage-setting prologues), and 
highly nuanced (there are, for example, 153 pages of footnotes). In terms 
of scope and power, Stump’s book clearly ranks among the best book 
length treatments of the problem of evil by such deservedly well-known 
philosophers as Alvin Plantinga, John Hick, marilyn Adams, and Peter 
van Inwagen. She advances what she claims is a defense of the goodness 
of God as understood in Judaeo-Christian tradition, especially as that 
concept of God has been articulated by Thomas Aquinas. Stump defends 
a narrative approach to good and evil, develops a philosophy of love and 
relationships, and offers some fleeting, intriguing suggestions about the 
nature of divine glory. While we raise some questions about the ultimate 
success of her project specifically in terms of its scope, we have no doubt 
that Stump has produced a book that deserves the careful attention of 
any philosophically able reader interested in the problem of suffering in 
light of the belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, essentially 
good God.
Stump follows Aquinas in developing and defending an account of 
suffering where suffering enables the sufferer to achieve a  great good 
(an affective unity with God) and avoid a great evil (willed loneliness). 
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In addition, she augments the model from Aquinas by defending the view 
that while suffering is generated by denying the desires of our hearts, in the 
final analysis it can be seen to offer the possibility of giving us the desires 
of our hearts, albeit in forms perhaps not imagined before the suffering. 
on Stump’s account, it turns out that suffering is, in a sense, good for us 
or is understandable as a benefit: “roughly considered, a benefit defeats 
suffering when the suffering is somehow integral to the benefit and the 
benefit is such that it is rational to prefer having the suffering to not having 
it, given the benefit which the suffering brings” (p. 488). Stump’s account 
is most powerful when she introduces and analyzes cases of individuals 
who have flourished as human beings and experienced heightened unity 
with God as a direct result of suffering.
Stump builds her account of suffering in the crucial central chapters 
of the book in which she takes up an extensive exploration of four biblical 
narratives involving Job, Samson, Abraham, and mary of bethany. Stump 
argues that narratives and relational experiences (what buber described 
as I-You relations) can be a source of knowledge that is not available in 
propositional, analytic format. Her term for knowing states of affairs 
through narratives is the Franciscan method, whereas propositional, 
analytic modes of knowing she calls Dominican. (It is doubtful that 
non-Christian philosophers would be happy with these terms and their 
accompanying connotations.) Knowledge reached by the Franciscan 
method is termed second-person in that the reader of the narrative 
enters into the characters with empathy based on some shared human 
experience. It is contrasted with the Dominican mode of knowledge 
characterized by third-person, objective, propositional analysis.
Stump’s discussions in the narrative chapters are both intensely 
illuminating and worrisome. The biblical texts she takes up are the 
narrative; her discussions of each are her interpretations of the texts. 
Where a  reader agrees with Stump’s interpretation of the narrative or 
finds it compelling, her approach is powerful and illuminating (see, for 
example, the account of Abraham); a careful reading of these chapters 
is very rewarding. However, narrative texts and their interpretations are 
much like empirical data and scientific theories; data underdetermines 
theoretical choice since a  number of theories are compatible with the 
data. If the reader finds Stump’s interpretation of the narrative not only 
possible but plausible, then the narrative support for her account of 
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suffering moves forward. but if the reader finds Stump’s interpretation of 
the narrative perhaps possible, but implausible (in the sense that motives 
and inner states are imputed to the actors in the narrative which seem 
unnecessary to a more straightforward interpretation of the text), then 
her interpretation of the narrative has less force.
to illustrate, Stump is provocative in the interpretation of the Job 
narrative with her heavy emphasis on the conversations between God 
and Satan and the parental way in which she sees God graciously 
working in a  redemptive way with Satan. This same parental theme is 
then emphasized in her re-telling of the Job narrative in terms of God 
dealing in a similar manner with Job and with all creatures. However, this 
parental theme is less potent if one simply takes the God/Satan prologue 
to be setting the stage for the story (noting that there is no narrative for 
how things turn out between God and Satan). one might read the famous 
passages at the end of the narrative where God asks Job where he (Job) 
was when he (God) set the boundaries for the sea, etc. less as referring to 
parental relations between God and his creatures, and more in terms of 
God noting that he is all-powerful and that even all of the chaotic world 
outside of human control is under his sway. This more common reading 
of the narrative (which Stump introduces as a foil to her interpretation) 
at least diminishes the parental theme which is crucial to Stump’s account 
of suffering. Divergent interpretations of narratives suggest that for all 
their Franciscan potentiality of second-person knowledge, our reading of 
narratives does not escape some Dominican analysis about the way the 
world is which we bring to the narratives.
While Stump claims that the truth of the biblical narratives is not 
essential to the cogency of her defense (because, after all, she is only 
describing a possible world, not necessarily the actual one), it seems to us 
that Stump’s project as a whole is best read as a theodicy or an identification 
of the values that would justify God in creating and sustaining the actual 
world with all its evil. Stump sees herself as following Aquinas in holding 
that “God’s allowing suffering [is] morally justified either as an antidote 
to permanent willed loneliness or else as therapeutic for deepened union 
among persons” (p. 22).
Stump’s treatment of suffering is limited by some self-imposed 
boundaries. The defense of suffering she marshals targets a specific class 
of persons: “It applies only to the suffering of mentally fully functional 
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adult human beings; it does not apply to human beings who are not adult 
or not fully functional mentally, and it does not apply to non-human 
animals” (p. 476). She defends this limitation by noting that there is no 
reason why an account of the benefit of suffering must handle all cases 
of suffering, and suggests that it may be possible to expand her present 
account to handle other cases of suffering. Her account of suffering, 
then, focuses primarily on the suffering of individuals with certain 
qualifications, and does not attempt to resolve questions of suffering for 
other categories of persons, e.g., the suffering of innocent children.
This setting of limitations also shows up at the outset when thinking 
of suffering as an evil on a  larger scale, a  scale beyond the analysis of 
suffering of particular individuals. She rejects any engagement with 
reflection on the Holocaust and comments:
Although it is vitally important for us to remember the Holocaust and 
to reflect deeply on it, taking it simply as one more example or counter-
example in academic disputation on the problem of evil strikes me as 
unspeakably awful. It is enough for me that I am a member of the species 
that propagated this evil. Stricken awe in the face of it seems to me the 
only response bearable. (p. 16)
Perhaps one reason (aside from diminishing the Holocaust as only one 
more example in a debate in the academy) for not discussing the Holocaust 
is because it would put in very sharp relief the scope of the justificatory 
nature of Stump’s project. Stump thinks that suffering is (or can be) good 
for us, which is why a recent review of her book in the Times Literary 
Supplement had this title “Great gifts of pain” (may 27, 2011, p. 32). It 
would be very hard indeed to claim that the Holocaust was a divine gift 
or that it would be the kind of event that could be covered by some of the 
moral intuitions Stump identifies, e.g. “on one common moral intuition, 
a good parent will sometimes allow the children she loves to suffer – but 
only in case the suffering confers an outweighing benefit on the child 
who experiences the suffering, and confers this benefit on him in some 
way that could not have been equally well achieved without the suffering” 
(p. 191).
As theists, we believe that it is far better to preserve the thesis that 
the Holocaust and much suffering is not justified. mass, industrial 
murder – genocide – should not occur, ever. We think it more promising 
to approach the problem of evil by asking whether it is incompatible 
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with God’s goodness for God to create and sustain a cosmos in which 
some events that occur are good and justified and some events are evil 
and unjustified. one can see the danger of a  justificatory approach to 
suffering when Stump asks whether, on her view, some suffering should 
be allowed or not prevented by us because this suffering might be good 
for the victim. Consider Stump’s addressing a case when someone named 
Paula is considering relieving the suffering of someone named Jerome:
but when Paula considers whether she ought to try to prevent or relieve 
Jerome’s suffering, she cannot know whether the future suffering of 
Jerome that she is considering is suffering that God will allow. That is 
because, if Paula does not do what she can to alleviate that future suffering 
of Jerome’s, someone else might do so. (p. 413)
This does not seem fully satisfactory, however, for Stump seems committed 
to holding that if Paula does not relieve the suffering, God will only 
allow suffering that is a benefit such that Jerome would retrospectively 
recognize the suffering as worth the cost.
to be fair, Stump is clear that suffering may only put the one suffering 
in a position to make a redemptive move toward human flourishing and 
unity with God. She notes: “Aquinas’s theodicy need not be committed to 
the implication that all suffering moves a sufferer closer to God, or to the 
implication that God is not justified in allowing suffering if it does not 
succeed in moving a sufferer closer to God” (p. 404). The sufferer retains 
libertarian free will which must be exercised. In addition, Stump is clear 
that her defense also means that individual suffering and its (potential) 
goods for the individual must be revalued by taking into account the 
extent of this life in contrast with the potential of everlasting life with God.
Stump’s book is distinguished by her working with a view of God that 
is profoundly personal; God is responsive to the conditions of the world 
and created souls. much may be opaque about the role of suffering when 
we look at the narratives of the lives of others and even consider our own 
narratives. She believes that a relationship with God is the deepest, true 
desire of our hearts. It may be that we are not aware of such a desire, but 
her defense draws back the curtain to show us how the goodness of God 
is responsible for (or God’s creative will is essential for) the created goods 
that we desire and gives us a glimpse of the enormous good of being in 
relation to God.
